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Pursuant to the Court/s minute entry, Rule 35 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the Court's order granting an
extension

of time, defendant/appellee

B & B Amusement

Corp.

("B & B") hereby responds to plaintiff/appellant's petition for
rehearing.
INTRODUCTION
Rehearing

need not be granted

since all of plaintiff's

arguments in her petition can be rejected upon the grounds that
plaintiff opened the door to the admission of evidence she now
contests.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT NEED NOT ADDRESS PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
THAT B & B SHOULD HAVE BEEN BARRED FROM CONTENDING
THAT CO-DEFENDANT CURTIS WAS AT FAULT
Notwithstanding plaintiff's claims to the contrary, this Court
need not consider and modify its opinion to address the argument
raised by plaintiff that the Arizona Appellate Court decision in
Matusik v, Arizona Public Service Co., 684 P.2d 882 (Ariz. App.
1984), compels the conclusion that "it was fundamentally unfair for
the trial court to allow B & B to put on trial evidence and
argument regarding [dismissed defendant] Curtis's fault after the
trial court had ruled that there could, as a matter of law, be no
fault ascribed to Curtis [sic]."
rehearing at pp. 2-3.)

(See plaintiffs petition for

This is so since:

(1) the special verdict

form presented to the jury, to which plaintiff's counsel agreed,
did not allow the jury an opportunity to apportion fault of the
dismissed defendant, Curtis; (2) defendant B & B did not

specifically argue the fault of Curtis; (3) B & B was properly
allowed to argue alternate causes for the bolt failure once
plaintiff herself opened the door to the very evidence which
plaintiff contends should not have been admitted; and (4) plaintiff
has misread

Matusik,

while

ignoring

that

body

of

case

law

supportive of the trial court's conclusion herein.
As to Point I above, the special verdict form prepared for the
jury and returned from the same read as follows:
We, the jury in the above entitled case,
deliver the following answers to the questions
submitted to us:
QUESTION NO. 1:
negligent?

Was B & B Amusements

Answer "yes" or "no".
ANSWER:

No.

QUESTION NO. 2: Was B & B Amusements'
negligence a proximate cause of injury to
Tammy Lamb?
Answer "yes" or "no".
ANSWER:
If you answer Question Nos. 1 and 2 "no,"
sign and return this verdict.
If you answer Question Nos. 1 and 2
"yes," then answer Question No. 3.
QUESTION NO. 3: What is the total amount
of "Category 1" damages (as defined in
Instruction No.
) suffered by Tammy Lamb
as proximate results of the accident?
ANSWER:
QUESTION NO. 4: What is the total amount
of "Category 2" damages (as defined in
Instruction No.
) suffered by Tammy Lamb
as proximate results of the accident?
ANSWER:

2

QUESTION NO. 5: Did Ms. Lamb fail, to
any degree, reasonably to mitigate her damages
from the accident?
Answer "yes" or

\

ANSWER:
If you answer
Question No. 4 "yes," then answer the
following question. If you answer Question
No. 4 "no," sign and return this verdict.
QUESTION NO. 6: By what amount, if any,
do you find that Ms. Lamb failed to mitigate
her damages through reasonable efforts?
ANSWER:
DATED: Sept. 4. 1990

Frank R. Davis
FOREPERSON

(See R. at 399-400

%

Furthermore, prior to oral argument in Ihis

case the following interchange occurred between the court and
counsel:
THE
COURT:
"
Collins
[plaintiff's
attorney], you#ve seen the Special Verdict the
court intends to use. Are there any problems
or exceptions with it?
MR. COLLINS [plaintiff's counsel]
the special verdict, Your Honor
(See H

'hi ) And contrary

;

Not with

plaintiff's implication

otherwise, <*- closing argument II IK B'* counsel
dismissed
p 1 ii i lit;

L

ft'*

defendant

Curtis

was

specifically

of

tor

*••• above, plaintiff cannot contend that the trial court

improperly allowed the jury to apportion fault
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In her petition for rehearing plaintiff has ™
Court to its decision in Sullivan.
1

Jcoulai

Grain
an

cited the

individual

or

entity

dismissed

from

a case

pursuant

to an

adjudication on the merits of the liability issue may not be
included in the apportionment" (footnote omitted), that case does
not apply since, even if B & B had argued Curtis7s fault to the
juryf Sullivan was decided after the jury entered its verdict in
this case and there is no evidence that Curtis's proportionate
share of faultf if any, was "included in the apportionment."
Indeed, although not expressly stated in her petition for
rehearing, plaintiff is asking the Court to acknowledge therein her
speculation that the jury must have concluded that Curtis was at
fault in this case. Yet, based upon the undisputed facts set forth
in defendants appellate brief at paragraphs 24-30 and 35 (pp. 1314,

17), the jury could have

just as likely concluded that

defendant was not negligent in this case and plaintiff had suffered
no damages (required for a prima facie claim) since:

(1) she had

lost her job prior to the accident; (2) she had suffered before the
accident from headaches, back pain, trouble sleeping and stiffness
and spasms in the neck; (3) prior to the accident she had been
involved in an automobile accident where her leg and shoulder had
been injured; (4) prior to the accident she had fallen while water
skiing and had hurt her back while playing volleyball; (5) prior to
the

accident

she had confirmed with physicians

her physical

problems including those enumerated above and weakness, dizziness,
trouble with seeing, eye pain, double vision, ringing in the ears,
nausea, vomiting, abdominal pains and musculoskeletal concerns;
(6) prior

to

the

accident

plaintiff

was

taking

strong

pain

medication; and (7) at the time of the accident the impact involved
4

therein was as nominal and equivalent to stopping at a stop sign in
a normal way without sliding.

(See defendant's brief at 13-14f

17.)
In short, had plaintiff or her counsel believed from the
jury's verdict that the jury impermissibly attributed fault to
Curtis, plaintiff could have requested that the Court address this
belief with the jury before plaintiff agreed that the jury could be
dismissed. Plaintiff's speculation that the jury based its verdict
on Curtis's fault is an impermissible argument for reversal.

See

generally First Security Bank v. Kimball, 786 P.2d 1326, 1334 (Utah
1990); id. at 1340 (Howe, J., dissenting) (sheer speculation that
jury disregarded evidence).
Second, in claiming that "it was fundamentally unfair for the
trial court to allow B & B to put on trial evidence and argument
regarding Curtis's fault after the trial court ruled that there
could, as a matter of law, be no fault ascribed to Curtis [sic]"
(see plaintiff's petition at pp. 2-3), plaintiffs are essentially
claiming that the Court erred in allowing Dr. Blotter (defendant's
expert) to testify that a defective bolt may have caused the injury
and to allow such testimony after the defendant who allegedly
manufactured the bolt had been awarded summary judgment in this
case.
In making this claim, however, plaintiff ignores in her
petition for rehearing that she opened the door to this testimony
through examining her own expert witness at trial.

Specifically,

as noted in defendant's initial appeal brief:
18.
David

Plaintiff presented the testimony of
Clark
Stephens,
her
accident
5

reconstructionist, who testified that the case
was relatively simple. (R. 549 at 146.) He
discussed a "fault-tree analysis" which he
stated was a method of system safety
engineering or looking at all the possible
causes for accidents.
(R. 549 at 146-52.)
Thereafter, Mr. Stephens testified regarding
application of the bolts in question including
their intended tensile strength and designed
ability to withstand force. Mr. Stephens was
then asked by plaintiff's counsel to discuss
his fault-tree analysis with respect to the
alleged coupling-device failure and alleged
lap-bar failure of the car behind. (R. 549 at
153-59.) In addressing the question posed by
plaintiff's counsel himself, plaintiff's own
expert testified that the bolt could have
broken. (R. 549 at 188-89.)
19. Thereafter, . . . plaintiff's expert
volunteered that one of the possibilities for
the failure was a defective bolt due to
"hydrogen impregnation during cadmium plating
of a bolt while it is being manufactured,"
which, as plaintiff's expert testified, was
"the only other possibility [for the accident]
that even [B & B's expert was] going to be
able to come up with." (R. 549 at 198.)
20. Upon cross-examination, plaintiff's
own expert again stressed without objection by
plaintiff that the most probable defect in a
bolt would be one resulting from hydrogen
impregnation and that he "recognize[d] that a
flaw could exist in the wire that the bolt was
manufactured out of." (R. 549 at 221.)
21. Plaintiff's own expert also offered
on cross-examination the following testimony:
"I am sure that if the bolt had a flaw that
reduced the tensile strength by 80 percent, it
would never get sold on the open market." (R.
549 at 222.) And plaintiff's expert admitted
that there are such things as "Taiwanese
counterfeit bolts." (R. 549 at 222-23.)

23. Further,
during
re-direct
plaintiff's counsel himself continued to ask
questions of plaintiff's expert regarding the
defective manufacturing of bolts and elicited
the
testimony
that
the
problem
with
counterfeit bolts was "that the basic strength
6

of material is reduced, so that with either
shear or tension, it is going to have a lower
failure value." (R. 549 at 239-40.)
(See R. 549 at 146-59, 188-89, 196-98, 221-23, 239-40; cited in
defendant's appeal brief at pp. 10-12.)
It was only after this plaintiff herself presented this
testimony during her case in chief and through plaintiff's expert
witness

that

defense

expert

Dr. Blotter

testified,

without

objection, concerning the issue of counterfeit bolts and the flaws
and failings regarding the manufacture of the same. (See R. 550 at
385-87, 405-07, 417-26; cited at defendant's appeal memorandum pp.
16-17.)

Importantly, on cross-examination plaintiff's counsel

again opened the door to this issue by asking Dr. Blotter to
further discuss the issue of counterfeit and flawed bolts. (See R.
550 at 449, 452, 456, 468-70; cited in defendant's appeal brief at
11 36 p. 17.)
As the Utah Court of Appeals noted in State v. Pacheco, 778
P.2d 26 (Utah App. 1989), the admission of otherwise inadmissible
evidence has been held to not constitute reversible error where one
party opens the door for its admission, as "reference to or use by
[a party] of an erroneously admitted line of evidence ordinarily
cures or waives error."

(See id. at 30 (quoted and cited cases

omitted).)
In short, plaintiff cannot contend that the trial court erred
in allowing defendant's expert witness to present evidence as to
defective bolts

(and in allowing the jury to draw inferences

therefrom) when plaintiff herself opened the door to this evidence,
cross-examined

the

defense

expert
7

on this

point,

failed

to

contemporaneously object at trial to Dr. Blotter's opinions in this
regard, and where there is no evidence that the jury even found the
nonparty

(Curtis) at fault or apportioned any fault away from

B & B.
Third, in citing the Court to the Arizona appellate decision
in Matusik, plaintiff ignores or misunderstands the fact that:
(1) that case and plaintiff's quoted cite are inapposite since it
involved a suit and issues for damages against co-defendants as
implicitly recognized in J.W. Hancock Enterprises v, Arizona State
Regency, 690 P.2d 119, 129 (Ariz. App. 1984) (citing Matusik for
the

proposition

that

the

court's

holding

therein

barred

relitigation between parties who had asserted claims against each
other); (2) plaintiff is speculating that upon remand defendant
Curtis will raise and the trial court will allow defendant Curtis
to argue that B & B was at fault (no apportionment would be allowed
under this Court's decision in Sullivan):
involve

the

relitigation

of

a decision

(3) Matusik did not
by

the

trial

court

dismissing the plaintiff's theory against a single co-defendant;
(4) Matusik does not address the fact here that plaintiff herself
opened the door to evidence of a potential alternate cause of her
injury, namely that the bolt had been improperly manufactured;
(5) once plaintiff in this case learned before trial of B & B's
intent to have Dr. Blotter testify to alternate causation for
plaintiff's damages, namely the defective manufacture of the bolt,
plaintiff could have moved for an interlocutory appeal from the
trial court's dismissal of her action against defendant Curtis—
which request for appeal could have avoided plaintiff's claim that
8

defendant B & B was allowed to shift the blame at trial; and
(7) plaintiff has ignored the overwhelming case law refuting the
Court's opinion in Matusik.
Indeed, as to the first and last points listed above, the
Court is referred to Gates Leer Jet Corp. v. Duncan Aviation, 851
F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1988) (one defendant not bound by issues
litigated between plaintiff and another defendant as long as no
adversity existed between defendants and no claim between them was
brought in issue, litigated and determined); State of Alabama v.
United States Environmental Protection Agency, 911 F.2d 499 (11th
Cir. 1990) (defendant State of Alabama in first suit not prohibited
as plaintiff in second suit from suing co-defendant since State of
Alabama not bound by trial court's decision in first suit that
plaintiff therein had failed to state claim against co-defendant);
Franklin Stainless Corp. v. Mario Transport Corp., 748 F.2d 865
(4th Cir. 1984) (defendant not required to oppose co-defendant's
motion for dismissal in first case in order for defendant to sue
co-defendant in second case).

See also Wood v. Sympson, 833 P.2d

1239 (Okla. 1992) (judgment against one defendant settles nothing
between co-defendants unless conflicting or hostile claims are
brought in issue through cross-petition or separate or adverse
answer or were actually

litigated and adjudicated); National

Farmers Union Property v. Frackelton, 662 P.2d 1056 (Colo. 1983)
("it

is

essential

that

parties

should

be

adversaries

among

themselves before being bound by a judgment"; error for trial court
to bind plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action to the jury's
finding of relative fault in a prior action to which plaintiff was
9

not a party); Williams v. Evans. 552 P.2d 876 (Kan* 1976) (in order
for co-defendants in prior action to be adverse parties in later
action, they must be on opposite sides of issue as raised by
appropriate cross-pleadings among themselves; it is insufficient to
bar

later

claims

if

by

separate

answers

co-defendants

liability and claim accident was due to negligence of other)•

deny
Cf.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co, v. Geary, 230 U.A.R. 38, 38f 41 n.4
(Utah App. 1994) (third party to contract in declaratory relief
action not barred by effect of defaulting defendant).
Based upon this case law, even if the decision in Matusik was
properly cited and applicable, it would be erroneous for this Court
to rule that B & B should have opposed Curtis's motion for summary
judgment so that it could later present evidence in response to
plaintiff's own expert witness that the manufacturer of the bolt in
question was the cause of plaintiff's injury.
POINT II
THE COURT NEED NOT MODIFY ITS OPINION
TO ADDRESS ANY ADDITIONAL ISSUES
SURROUNDING TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT'S EXPERT
Notwithstanding plaintiff's claims to the contrary, this Court
need not revise its opinion to address the issues plaintiff now
raises as to:

(1) whether B & B is prohibited from responding to

testimony presented by plaintiff's expert as to the manufacturing
of the bolts when defendant did not supplement its answers to
plaintiff's interrogatories prior to trial; (2) whether plaintiff
need make a contemporaneous objection to evidence sought to be
admitted

at

trial

when

plaintiff

10

opened

the

door

to

the

admissibility

of such evidence; and

(3) the issue of how an

opposing party opens the door to the admission of such evidence.
Although not cited by plaintiff, even this Court's dicta in
State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989), is inapplicable where
this Court generally noted that in order to preserve an issue
challenging

the admission

of evidence

at trial the criminal

defendant need not make a specific objection at trial to the
evidence where a pretrial motion to suppress has been made and
denied by the same trial judge.

That case did not involve the

issue here where (as discussed supra) plaintiff herself opened the
door to the admission

of the very testimony

she claims was

prejudicial to her case.
This Court has long recognized the "contemporaneous objection"
rule which essentially requires a party to object to the admission
of any evidence each time the opposing party seeks to admit the
same. If the Court accepts plaintiff's argument on appeal, a party
would be allowed to file a motion in limine seeking to prohibit the
admissibility of certain evidence, open the door at trial to that
testimony through her own expert, and then contest the fact that
the defense
inadmissible.

responds with that

evidence plaintiff

claims is

Further, to ignore the contemporaneous objection

rule would allow a party to claim that all it needs do is object
once to the requested admission of prohibited evidence in order to
preserve its argument on appeal when the evidence later comes in
over that party's silent acquiescence.
Further,

based

upon

the

undisputed

facts

set

forth

in

defendant's initial brief on appeal, plaintiff cannot competently
11

argue that she was unaware that defendant would attempt to admit
evidence of a defective bolt given the appropriate opportunity.
(See defendant's initial memorandum at factual paragraphs 3, 5, 6,
7, 8, 10, and 13.) And, since plaintiff cannot claim that she did
not open the door to such evidence, this Court need not revise its
opinion at plaintiff's request that the Court educate the bar as to
the scope of the "open door" rule.
POINT III
THIS COURT NEED NOT ADDRESS PLAINTIFF#S THEORY
THAT A REASONABLE JURY COULD NOT HAVE
FOUND THAT B & B WAS NOT NEGLIGENT
On Page 5 of plaintiff's petition for rehearing she encourages
this Court to analyze whether a reasonable jury should have found
that B & B was not negligent.

The Court need not consider this

claim, however, since as set forth in defendant's initial brief on
appeal:

(1) plaintiff failed to meet her burden on appeal of

marshalling all evidence in support of the jury's verdict before
claiming the insufficiency thereof (see defendant's initial brief
at pp. 44-45); (2) any error was harmless given the incredible and
unbelievable

evidence

offered

by

plaintiff

at

trial

(see

defendant's initial memorandum at pp. 40-44); and (3) any error was
harmless given evidence of flawed bolts provided by plaintiff's own
expert and plaintiff's lack of surprise concerning such evidence
(see defendant's initial memorandum at pp. 38-40).
POINT IV
THE "DYNAMICS" OF THIS CASE ARE NOT "PECULIAR"
AND DO NOT JUSTIFY A NEW TRIAL IN THIS MATTER
Notwithstanding

plaintiff's

claims

to the

contraryf

the

"dynamics" of this case are not "peculiar" and do not warrant a new
12

trial.

Although plaintiff wishes to reassert the noncontrolling

opinion in Westinqhouse Elevator Co. v. Herron, S21 A,M

J \ (Pa.

1987) (cited on pp. 5-6 of plaintiff's petition for rehearing),
defendant has already demonstrated to the Court that application of
this case is inappropriate in compelling B k H ID I et i y ' lu

matter

when the trial court committed no error in reaching its verdict in
B & B's favor. As set forth in Scott v. Webb, 641 S.W.2d 331 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1982) (cited on p. 25 of plaintiff's initial memorandum),
plaintiff has had her day in court with respect to defendant B & B
and absent ieversible error she cannot force B & B to relitigate
the issues again.

Certainly, immediately after the Court granted

defendant Curtis summary judgment, plaintiff was aware of the risks
of trying this case only against h ht II and was already aware that
B & B claimed the injury was caused by the bolt manufacturer (see
B & B's initial brief at pp. 6-9). Nevertheless, plaintiff made a
conscious choice not to move for an interlocutory appeal t c> obtain
review and possible reversal of Curtis's dismissal so that she
could avoid any prejudice from trying this case against B k B
alone. Plaintiff's tactical decision regarding trying this lawsuit
against only B & B should not ultimately work to B & B's prejudice.
Finally, plaintiff is requesting that this Court force B & B
to retry this case even though no error was committed in its favor
since plaintiff believes that without B k B present at trial
defendant Curtis will be absolved from liability by claiming that
B & B was at fault. Nevertheless, in essentially making this claim
and contending that such potential by Curtis at trial creates a
"peculiar dynamic" warranting a new trial against B k Br plaintiff
13

ignores the fact that she is only speculating that defendant Curtis
will attempt such approach and be successful in the same.

This

"speculation" by plaintiff as to what could happen if on remand she
is forced to try this lawsuit only against defendant Curtis does
not merit a reversal of an error-free judgment in B & B's favor*
CONCLUSION
Since this Court has sufficiently addressed plaintiff's issues
on appeal and inasmuch as plaintiff's arguments in her petition for
rehearing center around the admissibility of evidence to which
plaintiff

herself

opened

the

door,

this

Court

should

plaintiff's petition for rehearing.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

/(

day of

1994.
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